Pétain, WAR CHIEF

When the First World War erupts, August 3, 1914, Colonel Pétain heads the 4th Infantry Brigade (made up of the 8th and 110th I.R.s) of which he took temporary command on March 20, 1914.

Engaged in the province of Namur from the initial shock with the enemy, the 4th Brigade contributed, notably on August 29 at the time of the Guise strike destined to stop the German advance, to ensure the stripping operation decided by Lanrezac before the menace of encirclement of the 5th Army.
Named Brigadier-general on August 30, 1914, he take command, on September 3, of the 6th Division at the head of which he takes part in the battle of the Marne, ordered by Joffre. September 6, subsequent to a preparatory artillery strike, he launches his division in the direction of Saint-Bon, a few kilometers in the south of Esternay. But his infantry flutters under enemy fire. So he advances to the first line of attack, exceeds it and continues towards the crest of Saint-Bon swept by German fire. His example swept the entire division whose success will open the road to Monceau-lès-Provins.

September 27, he is named, to the Order of the Army: « By his example, his tenacity, his calms under fire, his endless foresight, his constant intervention in difficult times, he obtained from his Division, during fourteen consecutive days of battle, a splendid effort, resisting to repeated daytime and night-time attacks, and on the fourteenth day, in spite of the losses suffered, victoriously pushing back a furious attack of by enemy. »
He is made Officer of the Legion of Honour, October 8, 1914, with a new mention : « General Officer of the greatest value which, in the current circumstances, is characterized by qualities of first order, remarkable by his bravery, his calms under fire, and the example of fearlessness which he gives to his men. Has a sense of duty of the highest order. »

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Now is launched the dazzling career of Philippe Pétain, which is comparable to those of the Marshals of the Empire. The war chief qualities of which he has just proven under fire at the head of a brigade then of a division, complement those qualities he had shown in his former commands, as well as in his responsibilities of professor of infantry tactics at the Higher War School. After having promoted him to the division level on September 14, the high command, October 25, 1914, cannot be faulted for placing him, at the head of 33rd Corps planted in the 10th Army and engaged in Artois.

On May 10, 1915, he is made commander of the Legion of honour: « Has, with a remarkable tactic, organized the attack of a German position, and then has directed that attack with an extreme energy, obtaining from troops under his command the most splendid momentum. »
However, the cost in human lives and the feeble successes, not to mention the failures of the offensives carried out according to traditional tactics, lead Pétain to conclude:
- that it is necessary to employ the attack techniques carried out in a war characterized by laying siege. Because trenches warfare freezes the front lines leaving control of the battlefield to canons and machine-. Conclusion which he translates in a few words : « Offence is firepower which advances. Defence is firepower which brings to a halt (…) the gun conquers; the infantry occupies (…) a minimum of infantry, a maximum of artillery (…) because firepower kills. » In a word, Pétain refuses to conduct the battle by « firing shots of men. » His biographer writes, « That is the reason why History retains his name » ;
- that artillery-infantry coordination requires the intervention of observation-type aviation in the precision targeting of artillery in its barrages, in its artillery support or counter fire ;
- that the war took the shape of a war of attrition. It is thus necessary to limit the losses as much as possible by favouring defence.

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This last conclusion is not shared by Joffre who, with the autumn 1915, decides to launch in Champagne a great offensive led by the 4th Army (Langle de Cary) and the 2nd Army (Pétain).
It is a failure. After having submerged the first German lines crushed by artillery, the attack died, exhausted, on a second line located at a few kilometers back and occupied by forces out of reach of artillery fire.
For Pétain, the lesson is clear. Henceforth, he will apply the defensive tactics known as the «second position», and he will, so a long time as the enemy holds a numerical superiority, be opposed to offensives of great style.

It is the Germans who take the initiative of launching the offensive on February 21, 1916, the Verdun thunderbolt. Within the constellation of the French Generals, Joffre immediately chooses Pétain and, to organize defence, gives him the command of the 2nd Army. In his Memoirs (p.215), he will pay homage to Pétain: « The commander of the 2nd Army was endowed with very great military qualities which, during the war and in particular at the beginning of the battle of Verdun, were precisely highlighted. It is by a constant improvement of the organization of the command, by a very acute tactical direction, and by an unceasingly renewed improvement in defence processes, that Verdun was saved. And it is General Pétain who was truly at the heart of all these advances. One must never forget that by endless study of enemy combat processes, he made our army realize the greatest tactical progress of the entire war; in particular, connection of aviation and artillery which was so productive. »
Indeed, the lesson drawn, in particular in Artois and Champagne, confirmed, in Pétain’s mind, the decisive character of artillery-infantry-aviation coordination which requires a degree of air superiority allowing observation aircrafts to regulate artillery fire. Thus along with colonel Barès, he has reinforced the means of aerial observation as well as the fighter units essential to their protection. He entrusted this task to Commander de Rose, who headed five fighter escadrilles: « Rose, clear the sky for me, I am blind… If we are driven out sky, then it is simple, Verdun will be lost. »

In a few months the enemy, in the person of Ludendorff, will analyze his defeat in front of Verdun: « A powerful artillery, perfectly directed by the airplanes, followed by an enormous accumulation of ammunition, had beaten and shattered our own artillery. The defensive power of our infantry was reduced to such a point that massive attacks by the enemy could succeed. » (War Memoirs, volume I, pp.292-293).

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For Pétain, it’s the « Poilu » was the victor of Verdun. But History holds that, without the humane qualities of their Chief, these admirable combatants could not have, for ten long months, supported the excruciating physical and moral sufferings which were theirs. A Chief who, at the time of his welcoming under the Cupola, January 22, 1931, will be aggrandized by Paul Valéry: « Such tenderness in you for these men whose inexpressible pain, whose weariness, sufferings, mutilations, and corpses were the substance of victory. The soldier little by little learned to know you: he found the Man within you. »
It is, in May 1917, these qualities which have him be selected to take command of the French Armies whose moral is severely struck, following the offensive of the Chemin des Dames. In a few weeks, Pétain restores the situation. The great critique, Liddell Binder, will pay the most vibrant homage to this unique action, by affirming that « A man without whom he would not have survived the crisis of 1917 was indispensable to France. Even a Foch would then likely have precipitated the fall of France rather than avoided it. »

On August 24, 1917, a brief citation accompanies the naming of Pétain to the dignity of the Great Cross of the Legion of Honour: « General Officer of the highest moral value whose rare qualities and whose character asserted themselves in the command of the Armies of North and the North-East. Has defended and saved Verdun. »

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Faithful to his strategy, Pétain remains on the defensive. However, in July, August and October 1917, he launches offensives aimed at limited objectives, crowned success, such as the Malmaison venture. But, most of all, he pursues the operational training of a strong reserve of 40 divisions which he could constitute thanks to the arrival of American divisions which, in full agreement with Pershing, are put gradually put into readiness status by assigning them to calm sectors of the front, while waiting to engage them on an active front, such that of Saint-Mihiel.

This strategy must take account of the constant reinforcement of German forces by the release of large units from the Eastern Front, enabled by the Soviet capitulation. Pétain summarizes it: « I await the Americans and the tanks. » That is the subject of his directive n°4 of December 20, 1917: « We and our allies will recover the manpower superiority only at the time when the American army will be able to put on line a certain number of major units; up to that point, we must, under risk of immediate erosion of power, keep a wait-and-see attitude, with the definite objective, as soon as possible, of taking up the offensive which alone will give us the final victory. »

The general reserve strength, created and then trained thanks to this wait-and-see attitude, will come to the help the British manhandled in Picardy in February 1918 by a German offensive. Regrouped under emergency in May 1918, these reserve forces make it possible to clog the pocket created by the enemy who - benefiting from the Foch’s stubbornness in spite of urgent requests by Pétain, kept the British for too long a time in Flanders - has advanced to the Marne at Château-Thierry after having crushed the 6th Army (Duchêne) in the sector of the Chemin des Dames. These reserves finally make it possible to open, in July 1918, the wings of victory, at the time of the second battle of the Marne which engages 600 tanks and 1,000 airplanes, and marks the change in the tides of war.

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Strengthened by the lessons learned in combat and, in particular, in operations in the sky of Verdun, Pétain, in a letter dated May 27, 1917, had drawn the attention of War Minister, Painlevé, to the fact that, « aviation took a cardinal importance. It became one of the essential factors of success. One must be Master in the air. » And, the day before the second battle of the Marne, he had underlined in his directive n°5 dated July 12 1918 that, « tactical surprise will be obtained by the suddenness of the attack preceded by preparatory artillery and by aerial bombardment as short-duration and as massive as possible, that is to say without artillery preparation on behalf of the eruption of tanks opening the way for infantry and artillery. The role of aviation is of the highest importance ».

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Thus, airplane-and-tank couple has just been born and will triumph. The Germans won’t forget it. Nor Pétain which will in vain request,
- in a report of January 5, 1919, the constitution of a force of 6,875 light tanks and 435 heavy tanks,
- in a note addressed on December 2, 1931 to the president of the Council, « the urgent constitution of an aviation of defence and of powerful attack capabilities. »

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Charles de Gaulle, in France and his Army, considers Pétain’s role in the road to victory: «One has a hard time seeing what the plans and dashes of Foch would have produced without all that was arranged by Pétain.» This decisive share is recalled in the August 7, 1918 citation which confers upon him the Médaille Militaire : « During this war, in his various commands at the levels of Brigade, Division, Army Corps, Army Groups, and the French Army, he always made proof of the most beautiful moral and technical qualities. A soldier at heart, he never stopped proving in spectacular fashion the pure spirit of duty and highest abnegation. He has always maintained a firm and benevolent discipline within the armies placed under his command, has upheld their morale to the highest degree and exalted their confidence. Has just acquired everlasting titles of national recognition by stopping the German onslaught and driving it back victoriously. »

On August 13, 1918, Hindenburg and Ludendorff ask William II to put an end to the war by the diplomatic channel. They estimate that Germany’s military situation is desperate, but they do not accept a capitulation which would dishonour an army that, for more than four years, has not ceased proving its warlike virtues.

On the Allied side, Pétain nourished the possibility of an offensive in Lorraine. On September 7, it charged Castelnau with preparing a powerful attack directed to the south-east of Metz. Under the orders of Castelnau and Pershing, the French and American forces will include 28 infantry divisions, 3 of cavalry, 600 tanks and more than 1,000 airplanes. On the opposite side, six German divisions of mediocre value.

This plan, Foch discussed it endlessly for the reason that it would do nothing but widen by 30 kilometers an already victorious 300 kilometer front. However, on October 23, he finally gives his consent and the offensive can be launched on November 14. It will not be launched, since the armistice under discussion between Wilson and Chancellor Max of Bade takes effect on November 11, contrary to the opinion of Pétain and Pershing who hoped that the signature of the Armistice would not take place before the enemy thrown back to the other side of the Rhine.
In a letter addressed to his family on November 21, 1918, Foch will recognize that the offensive envisaged involved « the complete destruction » of the « Krouts. » Then why had Foch prohibited it by delaying its release?
In any event, Pétain and his « Poilus » came to write the most beautiful page of the long history of the French Army. Clemenceau attests to it in his report to the President of the Republic proposing to confer the maréchalship to the Commander in Chief of the French Armies:
« Mister President,
«At the hour when all of France celebrates with a noble pride the final Victory of its arms, the Government of the Republic is honoured to convey the wishes of the Army and of the Country in proposing that you confer to General Pétain, one of the most glorious artisans of this victory, the dignity of Marshal of France.
« To outline the role played by General Pétain would be to tell the story of the War.
« The most beautiful services had already illustrated him when, placed at the head of the Army of Verdun, he inflicted upon the enemy a defeat which will remain famous forever, which has marked the decline of the German military power.
« Repeated successes, writes Marshal Foch, made of him the supreme Head of the French Armies.
« He knew to maintain these armies in the highest sentiment for the exercise of duty, achieving the persistence and the cohesion of energies until the end of the war.
« By a fight of more than seven months, with intensity without precedent, he leads his troops to Victory obtaining from them a splendid effort which crushed the enemy.
«General Pétain will have glory of having maintained at the highest, even in the sombre moments, the moral of the French soldier. His personal commandment, as benevolent as it was firm, forged the instrument of Victory that his military talents so highly contributed to assure.
« His last daily agenda shows full light this beautiful character of a French Chief who warns his troops against the abuse of force and suggests to them dignity and generosity in victory.
« History will place General Pétain in the first rank of Men of War who, during this long and terrible four-year battle, commanded the allied Armies.
« Led by chiefs of the highest value, our incomparable soldiers imposed upon the enemy this Armistice of November 11, 1918 which consecrates the triumph of the Entente. They have just reached the Rhine. The hour is thus upon us to grant to General Pétain the supreme military reward which will honour the Chief as well as glorify the victorious Army.
« If you approve this proposal, I have the honour of asking you to apply your signature to this decree.
« Please accept, Mr. President, the homage of my deep respect. »

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On December 8, 1918, at Metz, Pétain receives the stick of Marshal of France from the hands of Raymond Poincaré. One imagines his legitimate pride, but also the regrets as he will express, at the time of his induction to the French Academy, during his praise of Foch: « the great soldier, who had made of the decisive attack the culmination of his doctrine and the keystone of his teaching, will have to put down his sword before having destroyed his adversary. The Armistice which he will sign on November 11, in French territory, will save the proud German army a humiliating disaster and allows it to again cross the Rhine without concern. »
Under academic praise, is uttered the regret of not having been able to launch the offensive planned for November 14 which would have broken German pride. He expresses this feeling with his American friends: « Neither Pershing nor I wanted the Armistice; the entire left wing of the German army was routed, and we could have gone to Berlin. But the English were betraying us since August 1918 so that we would not have left bank of the Rhine. It is easy to prove to the German people that they were not defeated. Provided that this does not lead us a second world war which would be even more terrible than the first ! The evening of the Armistice, I shed tears ! ».
Prophetic tears ! On the other side of the Rhine, Hindenburg is already expressing his certainty in the rebirth of « the great and proud German army». His War Memoirs (Aus meinen Leben) recall the tears which he shed, age 11, saying good-bye to his father, as he crossed the iron gates of the Cadet School at Wahlstatt. The Memoirs conclude with the incantation: « I count on you, ô German youth! ».
In the West, in France, the incantations chant disarmament, even treason, while yesterday’s allies, Americans and English, refuse to create a protection of the Rhine. Shortly before his death which occurs on November 24, 1929, Clemenceau prophesies in turn : « five years, ten years, whenever they want, the Krouts will enter on our premises ».